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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

IMPORTS - STATE TAXATION OF A STATE-IMPOSED
NON-DISCRIMINATORY AD VALOREM PROPERTY TAX
ON IMPORTED GOODS IS CONSTITUTIONAL UNDER
THE IMPORT-EXPORT CLAUSE.
Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1976)
On January 14, 1976, the Supreme Court' affirmed the deci-

sion of the Georgia Supreme Court2 allowing the
assessment of4
s
a nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax on petitioner's5
stock of imported tires, which were no longer in import transit,
and which were maintained in its wholesale distribution warehouse in Georgia. 6 In its rejection of petitioner's argument that
1. Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1976).
2. Wages v. Michelin Tire Corp., 233 Ga. 712, 214 S.E.2d 349 (1975).
3. The tax had been assessed by respondents, the tax commissioner and tax
assessor of Gwinnett County, Georgia, on inventory held in petitioner's warehouse
on January 1, 1972 and January 1, 1973.
4. Petitioner, Michelin Tire Corporation, a New York corporation authorized
to do business in Georgia, is an importer and wholesaler of automobile and truck
tires and tubes.
5. The tires imported from Canada and France arrive at Michelin's warehouse
by either of two methods. Some are delivered in over-the-road trailers which are
packed and sealed at the foreign factories and brought directly to the warehouse
by common carrier. The other goods are transported in sea vans (over-the-road
trailers with removable wheels) which are packed and sealed at the foreign factories.
The vans are then hauled to the port where the wheels are removed and the goods
are transported by ship to the port of entry. There the vans are unloaded from the
ship, the wheels are replaced, and the goods move on to the warehouse.
The tires are packed in the trailer and vans in bulk - they are not packaged
or bundled. Each trailer or van load is unloaded and sorted upon arrival at the
warehouse. The individual shipments are no longer separate identifiable units. The
tires are stored in the warehouse where they are stacked on wooden pallets, segregated
by size and type awaiting sale to retail dealers. Although each tire has a serial number,
the individual tires are not treated or altered in any way.
6. Respondents had also assessed a tax on imported tubes in the warehouse.
The packing and handling of the tubes is different from that of the tires; they are
not shipped in bulk, but are individually packaged in small boxes which are transported in corrugated cartons. The tube shipments, like the tire shipments, are sorted
upon arrival at the warehouse at which time they cease to be separately identifiable
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the tax violated the Import-Export Clause of the Constitution,'
the Court's decision casts doubt on the viability of the venerated
original package doctrine,8 which heretofore has been the principal judicial test for establishing the constitutional limits on the
power of the states to tax foreign imports. A brief review of the
historical development of the law prior to the Michelin decision
will serve to demonstrate the importance of that case in elucidating the meaning and operation of the relatively obscure Import-Export Clause.
Brown v. Maryland9 was the first case to examine the effect
of the Import-Export Clause on the ability of states to tax
imports. In Brown a Maryland statute requiring an importer to
purchase a license before selling imported goods at wholesale was
challenged on the grounds that it violated the Import-Export
Clause. The Court acknowledged that it was necessary to determine at what point the prohibition on the states ceased and
their taxing power began. A test was needed to aid the Court in
establishing the limits of permissible state taxation. The Court's
response was to articulate the so-called "original package doctrine:"
It is sufficient for the present to say, generally, that when
the importer has so acted upon the thing. imported, that
it has become incorporated and mixed up with the mass of
property in the country, it has, perhaps, lost its distinctive
character as an import, and has become subject to the taxing
power of the State; but while remaining the property of

units. The cartons are stored by size in the full case area until they are opened; the
individual boxes of tubes are then shelved in the shelf area and are ready for sale in
small quantities.
Petitioner had conceded that the tubes in the shelf area were taxable. The
other tubes, remaining in their cartons in the full case area, had been held to be
non-taxable by the Georgia Supreme Court. Respondents did not raise this question
on cross-petition, so that issue was not before the Court.
7. "No state shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or
Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing
its inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any
State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United
States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Control of the
Congress." U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 10, cl. 2.
8. See notes 10 and 11 infra, and accompanying text.
9. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) 419 (1827).
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the importer, in his warehouse, in the originalform or package
in which it was imported, a tax upon it is too plainly a duty
on imports to escape the prohibition in the Constitution °
(emphasis added).
Here, because the goods were still within their "original packages,"
the Court held that the requirement of a license fee to sell them
was an unconstitutional tax on imports."
Later in the License Cases, 2 the Court applied similar reasoning in adjudicating a question which arose under the Commerce
Clause."1 The Massachusetts and Rhode Island cases concerned
state statutes prohibiting the retail sale of imported liquor in
small quantities without state licenses. 4 Finding that the laws
acted upon the liquor only after it had passed the boundary of
foreign commerce, and had become a part of the general mass
of property in the respective states, the Court held the statutes
to be nonviolative of the Commerce Clause, and therefore valid
regulations of intrastate commerce. 15
Next, in Low v. Austin, 6 the Court addressed itself for the
first time to the legality of a nondiscriminatory Michelin-type
ad valorem property tax. Relying solely upon the original package
doctrine, the Court struck down the state levy on the grounds
that it constituted a direct state tax on imports in contravention
of the Import-Export Clause. 7 Petitioners in Low were merchants who had paid duties on imported champagne at the
custom-house, and had then stored the wine in its original cases
10. Id. at 441-42.
11. Id. at 445.
12. Thurlow v. Massachusetts, Fletcher v. Rhode Island, Pierce v. New Hampshire, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847).
13. "The Congress shall have Power To regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST.,
art. 1, § 8, cl. 2.
14. Chief Justice Taney, who had been counsel for the State of Maryland in
Brown, perceived the issue to be whether these state laws were regulations of foreign
commerce or of the internal traffic of the individual states. He understood the original
package doctrine to have drawn the line at the point when the original package had
been broken up, for use or for retail by the importer and the commodity had passed
from the importer to the purchaser. License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 at 574

(1847).
15. Id. at 577.

16. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 29 (1871).
17. Id. at 35.
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in their warehouse, where it remained awaiting sale to retailers.
The Court, citing Brown and the License Cases, stated that imported goods did not lose their character as imports (and thereby
become incorporated into the "mass of property" of the state)
until they had passed from the control of the importer or had
been broken up by him from their original cases. Thus, even the
nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax levied on such goods
by the locality was held to be a violation of the Import-Export
Clause. This acceptance of the original package doctrine, forbidding the assessment of nondiscriminatory ad valorem property
taxes on imports, continued for many years. The Low rationale
was subsequently applied by the courts to invalidate similar
property taxes in varying factual contexts.'
18. See, e.g., Anglo-Chilean Corp. v. Alabama, 288 U.S. 218 (1933) (Annual
ad valorem levied by Alabama on goods in stock held unconstitutional as applied to
importer engaged in landing, storing and selling nitrate in manufacturer's 100-pound
bags) ; May & Co. v. New Orleans, 178 U.S. 496 (1900) (Shipping packages, rather
than small parcels in which foreign manufacturer packaged goods, considered "original
packages," the breaking open of which validly subjected goods to property tax);
Galveston v. Mexican Petroleum Corp., 15 F.2d 208 (S.D. Tex. 1926) (Where oil
shipped by tanker from Mexico was pumped into tanks in U.S. to await disposition
under previously arranged contracts, such intermediate pumping merely constituted
step in larger transaction and oil retaining its import character was not subject to
local taxation) ; Wilson v. County of Wake, 19 N.C. App. 536, 199 S.E.2d 665 (1973)
(Ad valorem tax held unconstitutional as applied to items which remained in the
condition in which they were shipped because shipment consisting of undercarriage
parts imported in wooden crates, in bundles and individually, was not the original
package, so sale of one portion of shipment did not break the package; nor did sorting
and stockpiling of the components of any shipment cause them to lose import character) ; Volkswagen Pacific, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 7 Cal. 3d 48, 101 Cal. Rptr.
869, 496 P.2d 1237 (1972) (Separately packaged auto parts held taxable where their
removal from sea vans in which they were shipped constituted final act of importation
before sales from warehouse by Volkswagen; further, where packaging is inherently
impossible or impracticable, an imported, unpackaged item loses its immunity from
state or local taxation when it is removed from an aggregate of other similar
unpackaged items imported as a unit with it and hence, the cars in question were
taxable) ; Michigan State Tax Commission v. Garment Corp. of America, 32
Mich. App. 715, 189 N.W.2d 72 (1971), cert. denied 404 U.S. 992 (1971) (Garments packaged in cartons which were shipped by sea van remained in the "original package" as long as they were in the cartons even though the cartons had
been removed from the van); American Mannex Corp. v. Cronvich, 251 La. 1014,
207 So. 2d 778 (1968) (Original package consisted of all oil well casings covered
by a given bill of lading and hence when a portion of the shipment was sold at retail,
all of the joints covered in the bill lost their previous status as imports and became
subject to local taxation) ; Florida Greenheart Corp. v. Gautier, 172 So. 2d 589 (Fla.
1965), cert. denied 382 U.S. 825 (1965) (Though shipments of lumber were com-
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9 a new aspect of the
With Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt,1
original concept came before the Court, namely, the distinction,
for purposes of the doctrine, between imports for sale and imports for manufacture. The Court held that imported hemp fibers
still bound in their original bales were immune from state taxation under the Import-Export Clause, because imports for manufacture lost their protected status only when (1) the packages
in which they were imported were broken; and (2) such goods
were appropriated to the manufacture for which they had been
imported.2 0 This import for use in manufacture concept was
taken one step further in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
2
Bowers and United States Plywood Corp. v. City of Algoma. Applying Brown and distinguishing Hooven, the Court upheld
the levy of both taxes because the materials for manufacture
there had lost their distinctive character as imports, i.e., all
phases of importation had ended. The goods were essential to
supply the daily needs of the manufacturers and had been put to
the use for which they were intended. 2
Thus, by the time the Michelin case came up for review,
the Supreme Court had behind it a body of law under which the

mingled with other similar imports held for resale, the individual pieces of lumber
were not subject to tangible personal property tax while they retained their original
form, i.e. while they remained in importer's yard before sale) ; Tricon, Inc. v. King
County, 60 Wash. 2d 392, 374 P.2d 174 (1962), cert. denied 372 U.S. 227 (1963)
(Steel and glass products held in importers' warehouses in original bundles, reels,
crates or packages until time of resale not subject to ad valorem tax).
19. 324 U.S.652 (1945).
20. Id. at 666.
21. 358 U.S. 534 (1959). In Youngstoun, iron ore, transported in bulk across
Ohio after having arrived at various ports, was received at Youngstown's iron and
steel plant. The ores were unloaded in the yards next to the plant and grouped there
by country of origin. As the ore was needed for daily manufacturing purposes, it
was taken from the piles to stock bins and finally to the furnaces. After the ore had
been consumed, other imported material was brought in, unloaded and placed on the
dwindling piles. An ad valorem property tax had been assessed on all ore in the
yards.
United States Plywood Corporation, which manufactured veneered wood
products made of both domestic and imported lumber, had a similar usage process.
The wood was shipped to the plant by rail directly from Canada, either loose or in
bulk. Since the wood was green when it arrived, it was taken to a storage yard,
segregated by country of origin, and allowed to dry before use. To facilitate the
drying process, the wood was stacked and then treated in kilns just before being used.
The state assessed an ad valorem property tax on half of the imported wood.
22. Id. at 549.
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constitutionality of state taxation of imports under the ImportExport Clause was primarily determined on the basis of whether
the subject goods were classifiable as imports (as defined by
the original package doctrine or a variation thereof) at the time
of assessment.13 Abandoning this time-honored approach, the
Court elected instead to focus on the nature of the state levy,
rather than the status of the goods, in order to ascertain whether
the tax was of a type intended to be prohibited by the Clause.
The Court began by examining the policies which the Constitutional framers originally sought to implement through the
Import-Export Clause, and then evaluated the nondiscriminatory
ad valorem property tax in light of these purposes. The Court
noted that the Clause was designed to effectuate three objectives.
First and foremost, the framers believed that the United States,
through the federal government, should speak with one voice in
its commercial dealings with foreign states.24 State-imposed
tariffs which could affect foreign commercial relations would be
inconsistent with that exclusive power. Secondly, the authors
of the Constitution anticipated that taxation of imports would
be a principal source of revenue for the federal government.2
23. The Georgia Supreme Court had addressed the question of the tires' import
status. First, the court rejected the theory propounded by appellants that the sea vans
were the original packages. The Georgia court maintained that this view would
make it impossible for importers using this contemporary method of transportation
to maintain the character of the imports once they had arrived in the United States.
Thus the imports did not lose that status as soon as they were removed from the sea
vans. Next, to determine whether the tires lost their import character when they were
sorted and commingled with other shipments preliminary to sale, the court adopted
the "two-hat" approach purportedly taken in Brown, viz., when the importer deals
with the goods as an importer, they are immune from tax, but when he deals with
them as a seller, they are taxable by the state. Finally, the court determined that
the tires were susceptible to a nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax because
they were unpackaged and commingled by size and type to make the individual units
immediately ready for sale. Wages v. Michelin Tire Corp., 233 Ga. 712, 722-23,
214 S.E.2d 349, 355 (1975).
24. 423 U.S. 276, 285.

25. Id. at 291, n.12, quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 12 (A. Hamilton): "It is
evident from the state of the country, from the habits of the people, from the experience we have had on the point itself, that it is impracticable to raise any very
considerable sums by direct taxation. Tax laws have in vain been multiplied; new
methods to enforce the collection have in vain been tried; the public expectation has
been uniformly disappointed, and the treasures of the States have remained empty.
The popular system of administration inherent in the nature of popular government,
coinciding with the real scarcity of money incident to a lanquid and mutilated state of
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Diversion of needed revenues to the states, through their assessment of import taxes, would have seriously endangered the
national fisc. Finally, it was hoped that a ban on state import
taxation would promote harmony among the states by depriving
inland states
seaboard states of the opportunity to tax indirectly
26
by levying what would amount to transit fees.
In light of these goals, the Court concluded that the framers
never intended an Import-Export Clause to preclude states from
assessing a nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax. First,
such a tax would have little impact on the federal regulation of
foreign commerce, since by definition it is unrelated to an article's
place of origin.2 7 Furthermore, this tax, if nondiscriminatory,
could not be used to create special protective tariffs or preferences
for domestic goods. 28 Nor would such a tax have any adverse

impact on the federal government's right to revenue from imposts
and duties, since ad valorem taxes, by their nature, are not
imposts and duties. The latter are basically taxes on the commercial privilege of bringing goods into the country, whereas an
ad valorem tax is an assessment by which the state apportions
29
the cost of local services provided for the benefit of its citizens.
trade, has hitherto defeated every experiment for extensive collections, and has at
length taught the different legislatures the folly of attempting them.
"... In so opulent a nation as that of Britain . . . far the greatest part of
the national revenue is derived from taxes of the indirect kind, from imposts, and
from excises. Duties on imported articles form a large branch of this latter description.
"In America, it is evident that we must a long time depend for the means
of revenue chiefly on such duties."
26. Id. at 285-86.
27. Id. at 286.
28. Id. Not only would a discriminatory tax pose serious constitutional problems,
it might also violate certain provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) ; see especially Article III, 111 which provides in pertinent part:
"1. . . . [I]nternal taxes . . . affecting the internal sale, offering for sale,
purchase, transportation, distribution or use of products, . . . should not be
applied to domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic production."
29. Id. at 287. The term ad valorem means a tax or duty measured by a percentage of the value or property subject to taxation. Arthur v. Johnston, 185 S.C. 324,
194 S.E. 151, 154 (1937).
The phrase "ad valorem" means literally "according to the value," and is
used in taxation to designate an assessment of taxes against property at a certain
rate upon its value. Powell v. Gleason, 50 Ariz. 542, 74 P.2d 47, 50 (1937) ; State
ex rel. Meyer v. Story, 173 Neb. 741, 114 N.W.2d 769, 772 (1962).
"Ad valorem" is a duty or charge laid upon goods at a certain rate per cent
upon their value as stated in their invoice in opposition to specific sum upon given
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The Court found no policy basis for not requiring an importer
to bear his share of the costs of these local services, such as
police and fire protection. Though the Import-Export Clause may
prohibit taxation on the basis of the foreign origin of the goods,
it does not require a state to grant preferential treatment to these
goods. Further, although federal revenue may be diminished
slightly if the tax discourages the purchase or importation of
foreign goods, this consequence was not a major consideration of
the framers. 80
As for the policy of promoting intrastate harmony, the Court
noted first that an ad valorem assessment is not a "transit fee"
such as the framers sought to avoid; rather, it is a tax on goods
more or less at rest, aimed at the importer and not at inland
states or out-of-state consumers.3 1 The Court further asserted
on this point that modem methods of transportation make possible direct importation to inland states. Finally, the Court noted
again that there was no reason why inland consumers should
not share with local taxpayers the costs of state benefits received
by the importer. 2
Having determined that the objectives of the Import-Export
Clause would not be furthered by the prohibition of this tax, the
Court looked to the historical meanings of "imports" and "duties,"
as used in the Import-Export Clause,33 to see whether a nondisquantity or number. Thomas v. City of Elizabethtown, 403 S.W.2d 269, 271, 272
(Ky. 1966).
30. 423 U.S. at 287. The Court noted that other decisions have allowed nondiscriminatory state taxes which were likely to have an incidental effect on the
volume of goods imported, citing Waring v. The Mayor, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 110
(1868) (taxation after initial sale); May & Co. v. New Orleans, 178 U.S. 496
(1900) (taxation of goods after breakup of shipping packages); Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 534 (1959).
31. The Court suggested that if such a tax were assessed on goods'still in
transit, it would be invalid under the Commerce Clause, 423 U.S. at 290, n.11. See
Powell, Taxation of Things in Transit, 7 VA. L. REv. 167 (1920).
32. 423 U.S. at 289.
33. "Impost is a tax received by the prince for such merchandise as are brought
into any haven within his dominions from foreign nations. It may in some sort be
distinguished from customs, because customs are rather that profit the prince maketh

of wares shipped out; yet they are often confounded."

BLACK'S LAW DIcTIoNARY

889

(4th ed. 1951) (citing Cowell's Law Dictionary). The word "imposts" in its more
restricted sense as used in the federal Constitution signifies a duty on imported
goods and merchandise. Union Bank v. Hill, 43 Tenn. (3 Cold.) 325, 328 (1866). In
its broader sense, the word means any tax or tribute imposed by authority and
applies as well to a tax on persons as a tax on property. City of Madera v. Black,
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criminatory ad valorem property tax was specifically within the
scope of those terms, as intended by the framers. Imposts, said
the Court, are charges levied on imports at the time and place
of importation. Duties were broader in scope, including excise
taxes as well as customs duties. The Court compared the clause
to the taxing power clause, 4 and determined that the latter's
broader coverage ("taxes, duties, imposts and excises") required
a narrow construction of the Import-Export Clause ("imposts"
and "duties").85 Acknowledging the ambiguity in the meanings
of "imposts" and "duties" as used in the clause, the Court decined to impute to the framers an intention to include ad
valorem property taxes in its prohibition.38
The Court's final step was to -overrule Low. That decision,
the Court declared, was based on a wholly superficial and inaccurate interpretation of the original package doctrine engen37
dered by an incorrect reading of Brown and the License Cases.
The Court then reinterpreted Brown, setting forth a new bifurcated standard putting the original package doctrine in its proper
perspective. Under the test,. as articulated by the Court, the
prohibition of the Import-Export Clause would not apply in two
situations, as outlined in Brown by.Chief Justice Marshall. The
first is when a state tax is levied on goods which are no longer
considered imports. Properly used here, the original package
doctrine can serve as an evidentiary tool in determining whether
181 Cal. 306, 184 P. 397, 400 (1919). See also Pacific Ins. Co. v. Spule, 74 U.S.
(7 Wall.) 433, 445 (1868) ; Hancock v. Singer Mfg. Co., 62 N.J.L. 289, 41 A. 846, 849
(1898).
A "duty" is ordinarily used in referring to levies upon imports and exports.
Gen. Mut. Ins. Co. v. United States; 119.F. Supp. 352, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
"A duty as the word is used in its most usual signification is the synonym of imposts
or taxes, but the word is sometime used in a.broader sense as including all manner of
taxes, charges or governmental imposition." In re Manville's Will, 102 N.Y.S.2d
530, 532 (Sdrr. Ct. 1950). See generally 1.W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 296-97 (1953).
34. "The Congress shall have Power jto lay. and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts
and Excises" U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1.
35. "[T]he clause is not written in terms of a broad prohibition of every 'tax.'
The prohibition is only against States laying 'imposts or duties' on 'imports.' By
contrast, Congress is empowered to 'lay.,and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and
Excises,' which plainly lends support to .a xeading of the Import-Export Clause as
not prohibiting every exaction or 'tax' which falls in some measure on imported
goods." 423 U.S. at 290.
36. Id. at 293-94.
37. 423 U.S. at 298-99.
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an item is an import - that is, how far it has travelled along the
continuum, from true import status to being "incorporated with
the general mass of property in the state."3
Under the second branch of the test, a prohibition will not
apply when a particular exaction does not qualify as an impost
or duty. 9 The Court inferred from Brown that so long as a tax did
not discriminate on the basis of the foreign origin of goods, it
could be levied even though the goods in question may 40not yet
be "mixed up with the mass of property in the country."
Finally the Court read- Chief Justice Taney's opinion in the
License Cases to imply that the Import-Export Clause did not
prohibit nondiscriminatory ad valorem taxes.4 '
The Michelin Court did not couch its holding in "original
package" language; it stated unequivocally that nondiscriminatory ad valorem property taxes can be constitutionally assessed on
goods no longer in import transit which are stored in a wholesale
warehouse, awaiting sale to retailers. The tires here, in fact,
would have fallen outside the protection of the doctrine as it has
been interpreted by the courts since Brown v. Maryland. How38. The actions of an importer might cause his goods to become so mixed
with the mass of property in the state that they lose their distinctive character
as imports, and are thus validly., subjected to the taxing power of the state;
if the importer takes no such action, the goods are not automatically immune from
state taxation.
39. The Court noted that Chief Justice Marshall had given examples of
exactions excluded from the prohibition: a tax on an importer who sells his goods
as an itinerant peddler, a service: charge on an importer for selling his goods
through a public auctioneer, or a property tax on plate or furniture used by the
importer himself. 423 U.S. at 298, citing 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 443-44.
40. "[T]he tax intercepts the import, as an import, on its way to become
incorporated with the general maiss of property, and denies it the privilege of' becoming so incorporated, until it shalt have contributed to the revenue of the State."
.
25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 443.
41. Chief Justice Taney spoke of the validity, as applied to importers, of a
personal property tax imposed on all State citizens which would include the value
of an importer's goods in his possession, but outside of foreign commerce:
Undoubtedly, a State may impose a tax upon its citizens in proportion to the
amount they are respectively worth; and the importing merchant is liable to this
assessment like any other citizen, and is chargeable according to the amount of
his property, whether it consists of money engaged in trade, or of imported
goods which he proposed to sel, or any other property of which he is the owner.
But a tax of this descriptioht stands upon a very different footing from a tax
on the thing imported, while it remains a part of. foreign commerce, and is not
introduced into the general mass of property in the State. 46 U.S. (5 How.)
504 at 576 (1847).
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ever, because the Court chose not to ascertain the tires' status
as imports, the decision's impact on the original package concept
is not entirely clear. The Court seems to have acknowledged the
doctrine's viability, yet diminished its importance by relegating it
to one of two alternative approaches to the question of state
taxation of imports. It may be of significance here that the tires
were no longer in "import transit;" this factor could in future
decisions be a key preliminary determination to the assessability
of a nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax.
It is of interest that in October, 1976, the Court declined to
review two companion cases from the Texas Supreme Court,
American Honda Motor Company, Inc. v. City of Farmers
Branch 2 and MatsushitaElectric Corporationof America v. City
of Farmers Branch. 3 Inventories of goods in those cases, which
had a history of importation, shipment, and storage similar to
that of the items in Michelin,4 had remained in their original
shipping cartons, and were the subject of a disputed tax assessment. Despite this fact, the Texas Supreme Court applied
Michelin retroactively, 5 and held the disputed inventories to
be subject to the nondiscriminatory ad valorem property taxes
assessed since 1972. The results in these cases further attest to
the diminished importance of the original package doctrine after
Michelin.
The ramifications of the Michelin decision on international
trade patterns remain to be seen, for states' responses now are
varied. Many states have already assessed ad valorem property
taxes on goods in warehouses. Others, including California and
42. 527 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. 1976), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3253 (U.S. Oct. 5,

1976).
43. 527 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. 1976), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3253 (U.S. Oct. 5,
1976). The cases came before the Texas.,Supreme Court twice. On the day that
application for certiorari, the Michelin decision was anthe court denied the first
nounced; as a result, the court agreed to rehear the application.
44. American Honda deals in imported parts and accessories for motorcycles,
automobiles, and outboards which are packed in corrugated cartons and shipped in
sea vans. On arrival at the Honda warehouse, the cartons are segregated into those
for surplus storage, and those for. open stock. Matsushita's imported electrical
products are packed in cartons and shipped in sea vans. The cartons arrive in
Farmers Branch still sealed.
45. It was on the issue of retroactivity of the tax, as mandated by the Texas
Supreme Court's decision, that the parties sought review by the U.S. Supreme
Court. Subsequent to the Michelin decision, the Court also denied a petition by
Michelin itself for a rehearing on. the question of Georgia's power to apply the
property tax retroactively. 424 U.S. 935 (1976).
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Texas, have declared publicly that they intend to do so.46 Some
commentators assert that as a practical matter, local authorities
will be compelled to impose such taxes, because no local government would pass up the opportunity to exploit a new source
of revenue by taxing warehoused imports. Further, local officials
might not wish to be accused of discriminating against United
States-made goods by taxing such goods in inventory while
exempting similarly situated imported goods from the property
tax.

47

When other legal and economic issues are considered, some
states do not see the immediate imposition of the taxes as a
foregone conclusion. The Louisiana constitution, for example,

exempts imports from ad valorem taxes.4 8 Thus, unless the state

constitution is amended, imports are not likely to be taxed at
the parish and local levels. Massachusetts, Florida, and Virginia
tax officials are awaiting legal rulings and 49results of economic
impact studies before making their decisions.
On the other hand, some states, such as Maryland, have taken
steps to ensure their economic welfare, not by levying the
taxes but by protecting importers from them. 50 There has been
some concern expressed in trade circles that states like Maryland
which do not tax imports will attract importers away from ports
which do impose such levies, causing a serious diversion of trade
flows. As yet, there is little substantial evidence to support this
fear. Furthermore, since New York and New Jersey do not tax
46. The Journal of Commerce, Jan. 23, 1976, at 1, col. 3.
47. The Journal of Commerce, Feb. 2, 1976, at 1, col. 4.
48. LA. CONST. art. 7, § 21(d). Tax officials say the exemption was placed
in the Constitution only because of the federal doctrine against state taxation of imports.. Siipra note 47.
49. Supra note 47.
50. In 1976, the Maryland legislature amended the state law on personal
property exemptions from taxation, by adding:
The governing body of any County or Baltimore City may by ordinance or
resolution grant an exemption from ordinary taxation to the inventory of
foreign imports of businesses. engaged in importing if the imported property
is in the hands of the importer and is in the original package.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 9A(e)(7) (1976 Cum. Supp.). The City of Baltimore,
pursuant to the power granted it:by the above, enacted an ordinance which effectuated
the General Assembly's mandate. In pertinent part, it reads:
The inventories of foreign imports of importers located within Baltimore City
shall be exempt from ordinary municipal taxation, provided the imported property
is in the hands of the importer and. is in the original package.
BALT. CITY CODE art. 28, § 84A.
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inventories, the Michelin ruling will not have an adverse effect
on the large volume of commerce carried on in those major port
states.51 Finally, most imported products are not held in inventory
on a temporary basis but are shipped directly to the consignee
thus escaping taxes enroute.52
At first glance, it would appear that the retroactive application of the Michelin decision implicitly countenanced in the
Court's denial of review in the Matsushita and American Honda
cases will have little effect on trade patterns, for any alteration
in commercial plans of a foreign importer now could not stop the
retroactive application of ad valorem property taxes on inventories
already landed. However, if states apply the taxes retroactively,
many importers and exporters could face financial hardship; for
some it might spell financial disaster.5
Finally, it should be emphasized that in overturning Low v.
Austin, the Michelin Court did not authorize states to burden
the importation of foreign goods by imposing a discriminatory
levy, under the guise of a non-discriminatoryad valorem property
tax. The decision is clearly limited to property taxes which
equitably apportion the cost of state services among citizens,
including importers, and from which importers have previously
been exempt.
Leslie D. Gradet
51. Supra note 47.
52. For example, retailers receive direct shipments of most of their imports;
imported automobiles are shipped directly to individual dealers. Id.
53. This comment was made by E. A. Dominianni, an attorney with the law
firm representing Michelin Tire Corp. See The Journal of Commerce, April 20,
1976, at 1, col. 1. For other discussions of the retroactivity issue, see id., Feb. 20,
1976, at 1, col. 3, and id., April 2, 1976, at 28, col. 3.

